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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
AND CORPORATE SEX CRIMES
ERIN SHELEY*
Introduction
Wherever there is a position of power, there seems to be
potential for abuse. I had a dream to go to the Olympics, and the
things that I had to endure to get there, were unnecessary, and
disgusting.
....
A question that has been asked over and over is: How could
have Larry Nassar been allowed to assault so many women and
girls for more than two decades?
The answer to that question lies in the failure of not one, but
three major institutions to stop him -- Michigan State University,
USA Gymnastics and the United States Olympic Committee.
When my story became public the US Olympic Committee
said, “Each doctor working with our athletes undergoes
background checks including an evaluation of medical licensure
actions. Unfortunately, this predator was not identified by any
organization during the time in question.”
Reports in the Nation’s leading newspapers and media outlets
document credible claims that Michigan State University
trainers and coaches received complaints about Nassar
going back to the late 1990s. These complaints were ignored.
....
A simple fact is this. If Michigan State University, USA
Gymnastics and the US Olympic Committee had paid attention
to any of the red flags in Larry Nassar’s behavior I never would
have met him, I never would have been “treated” by him, and I
never would have been abused by him.1
Former U.S. Olympic gymnast McKayla Maroney made these remarks
as part of her victim impact statement at the trial of Larry Nassar, former
Michigan State University physician and team doctor to the USA
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
1. McKayla Maroney, Victim Statement of McKayla Maroney, SCRIBD 2–3,
https://www.scribd.com/document/366590076/Victim-Statement-Final-McKayla-Maroney
(last visited May 13, 2020).
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Gymnastics national team. Nassar pled guilty to seven counts of criminal
sexual assault, in addition to separate federal child pornography charges. 2
But Maroney’s statement, like so many of the other 160 former gymnasts
who came to testify at his sentencing, implies that Nassar was not their only
abuser. Maroney refers to the complicated institutional framework which,
as an aspiring member of the Olympic team, she was expected to obey. 3
Elsewhere in her statement she describes how gymnasts of all ages were
often cloistered at the Karolyi Training Ranch in Huntsville, Texas, from
which parents were explicitly excluded.4 She indicates here how Michigan
State and USA Gymnastics’ repeated mishandling of complaints, coupled
with the categorical control the latter had over her life from a very early
age, facilitated fifteen years of abuse.5 Maroney makes rather explicit the
fact that she experienced her victimization as the product not only of
Nassar’s molestation but of the institutional entities that supported it.
The Nassar case is a particularly high-profile example of the relationship
between institutional power and sex abuse. It is unusual not only in the
depravity of the offenses, spread over a period of decades, but in the fact
that the institutions who facilitated it became the focus of public outcry,
arguably in part due to the eloquence of the victims who spoke publicly
about their experiences to the media and at trial. Several high-level officials
at these institutions were prosecuted for crimes related to their concealment
of Nassar’s abuse, including former Michigan State University president
Lou Anna Simon6 and former USA Gymnastics CEO Steve Penny. 7
Furthermore, the U.S. Olympic Committee has moved to remove USA
Gymnastics as the governing body for the sport,8 and the institution has
2. Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar Sentenced to Up to 175 Years in Prison for Decades of
Sexual Abuse, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018, 9:29 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/larrynassar-sentencing/index.html.
3. See Maroney, supra note 1, at 1–2.
4. Id. at 2.
5. See id.
6. See Vanessa Romo, Michigan State University Ex-President Charged with Lying in
Larry Nassar Case, NPR (Nov. 20, 2018, 10:19 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/
20/669845087/michigan-state-university-ex-president-charged-with-lying-in-larry-nassarcase.
7. Sarah Fitzpatrick & Alex Johnson, Former USA Gymnastics Head Steve Penny
Arrested on Tampering Charges in Abuse Probe, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018, 11:29 PM
CDT),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/former-usa-gymnastics-head-stevepenny-arrested-tampering-charges-abuse-n921476.
8. Kevin Dotson & Darran Simon, US Olympic Committee Moves to Revoke USA
Gymnastics’ Status, CNN (Nov. 6, 2018, 7:07 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/05/
us/usa-gymnastics-us-olympic-committee/index.html.
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filed for bankruptcy as the result of the numerous civil lawsuits brought by
victims.9
Nonetheless, despite the fairly low bar presented by the American
standard for corporate criminal liability—respondeat superior, which
allows corporations to be charged with all of the crimes of employees
committed within the scope of employment 10—neither USA Gymnastics
nor Michigan State University have been criminally charged for Nassar’s
offenses. Sovereign immunity prevents charges against the public
university, 11 but USA Gymnastics is a private 501(c)(3) entity, thus no
sovereign immunity concerns are present. The lack of criminal action in this
case is, sadly, all too typical. Even in the case of the Weinstein Company,
in which ample evidence suggests it was close to corporate policy for
employees to assist Harvey Weinstein in his sexual assaults of innumerable
actresses and professional contacts,12 no jurisdiction currently prosecuting
or investigating Weinstein himself has filed charges against the Company. 13
The doctrinal bar to prosecuting corporate entities appears to be that
courts have read into the respondeat superior standard the requirement that,
9. Holly Yan, USA Gymnastics Files for Bankruptcy After Hefty Lawsuits Over Larry
Nassar, CNN (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:03 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/05/us/usagymnastics-files-for-bankruptcy/index.html.
10. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93
(1909).
11. See Qiu v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 19-3630, 2020 WL 634036, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb.
11, 2020) (“Because a public university like the University of Cincinnati is an arm of the
state, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for compensatory and
punitive damages.”).
12. Sixteen former executives and assistants at Weinstein’s companies have said they
were fully aware of the unwanted sexual contact Weinstein routinely imposed on women in
professional settings. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:47 AM),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assaultharvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories. They describe “a culture of complicity at
Weinstein’s places of business, with numerous people throughout his companies fully aware
of his behavior but either abetting it or looking the other way.” Id. Some even admit to
engaging in subterfuge to facilitate Weinstein’s assaults: “A female executive with the
company described how Weinstein’s assistants and others served as a ‘honeypot’—they
would initially join a meeting along with a woman Weinstein was interested in, but then
Weinstein would dismiss them, leaving him alone with the woman.” Id.
13. Richard Winton & James Queally, Who Is Willing to Defend Harvey Weinstein? A
Third High-Powered Lawyer Wants Off Case, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2019, 3:33 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-harvey-weinstein-jose-baez-out-20190617story.html (describing New York criminal case against Weinstein and ongoing criminal
investigations in Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and London).
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in order for the entity to be criminally liable, the employee must at least
partially intend the crime to benefit the corporation.14 It is, of course,
difficult (though probably not impossible) to imagine how an employee’s
sex crime could serve to benefit his employer. I have argued elsewhere that
this is an anomalous result when we consider the operation of corporate
criminal mens rea as a whole. 15 Generally, criminal respondeat superior is
overbroad in the sense that it leaves a corporation on the hook for the
crimes of a single rogue employee, even when the government can make no
showing of even negligence at the institutional level. 16 Yet the operation of
the “intent-to-benefit” requirement means that, specifically in cases of sex
crimes, no amount of evidence of collective culpability (which arguably
rises to gross negligence in the case of USA Gymnastics, and even
willfulness in the case of the Weinstein Company) is ever enough to convict
the corporate employer.17 I have proposed that courts apply criminal
respondeat superior in accordance with the original doctrine in tort law,
which imposes no such intent-to-benefit requirement.18 I have also called
for legislative interventions to bring criminal respondeat superior in line
with tort respondeat superior in this way (among others).19
One reason such reforms may be a long time coming, however, is a
general reluctance among legislators, prosecutors, and the public at large to
see non-human entities as capable of committing bodily offenses. Only
fifteen states (plus the federal government) have cases on record reflecting
a corporation being prosecuted for manslaughter or negligent homicide. 20
14. See, e.g., Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722–24 (5th Cir.
1963).
15. See generally Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal
Mens Rea, 97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) [hereinafter Sheley, Tort Answers].
16. See id. at 785–86.
17. See id. at 801–02.
18. Id. at 777, 802–06 (arguing that tort respondeat superior—while broader than its
criminal counterpart in the sense that it allows for corporate liability for employee sex
crimes—is narrower in the sense that it is better cabined by a foreseeability requirement in
all cases). The proposed standard, while expanding corporate criminal liability for sex
crimes, bars liability in all cases where a rogue employee commits a crime that is either not
reasonably foreseeable to a person engaging in the corporation’s business or which the
corporation has taken all reasonable steps to prevent. Id. at 805–06.
19. Id. at 778–79.
20. See James W. Harlow, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: A
Statutory Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 123, 133 & n.65 (2011) (citing United States v. Van
Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602–05 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (permitting the indictments of a
corporation and its individual officers for manslaughter under a federal maritime statute);
Arizona v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/10

2020]

IMPACT STATEMENTS & CORPORATE SEX CRIMES

213

Given that it is arguably much easier to conceive of a homicide as the
product of corporate action (in, say, an industrial accident) than it is to
conceive of a sexual assault as being such, it stands to reason that the lack
of corporate criminal liability for sex offenses may boil down, in large part,
to a lack of imagination.
This Article argues that more frequently including victim impact
statements during the sentencing phase of corporate criminal trials would
help lay foundation for legislative reforms geared towards punishing
corporations on the occasions where genuinely corporate misconduct, such
as that of USAG and the Weinstein Company, can be said to have caused

the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent homicide); Granite Constr. Co. v.
Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 4 (Ct. App. 1983) (permitting the indictment of a
corporation for manslaughter under California law); Illinois v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090,
1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing the involuntary manslaughter conviction of an Illinois
corporation and its individual officers based on mutually exclusive mental states); Indiana v.
Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2514, 2515 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1979) (sustaining an indictment
against Ford for reckless homicide under Indiana law); Kentucky v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610
S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding the indictment of a corporation for seconddegree manslaughter under Kentucky law); Massachusetts v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 842
N.E.2d 930, 934 (Mass. 2006) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for motor-vehicle
homicide under Massachusetts law); Michigan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 438
N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (sustaining the indictment of a corporation for
involuntary manslaughter under Michigan law); New Jersey v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 103
A. 685, 687 (N.J. 1917) (upholding the indictment of a corporation for involuntary
manslaughter under New Jersey law); New York v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 807,
811–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (permitting, as a matter of New York law, the indictment of a
corporation for criminally negligent homicide but dismissing the indictment on other
grounds); Ohio v. Consol. Rail Corp., C.A. No. L-81-033, 1981 WL 5726, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 24, 1981) (requiring the trial court to address the validity of a corporate indictment
for vehicular homicide under Ohio law); Pennsylvania v. McIlwain Sch. Bus Lines, Inc., 423
A.2d 413, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (sustaining the indictment of a corporation for criminal
homicide by vehicle under Pennsylvania law); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. Texas, 737 S.W.2d
805, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (affirming the conviction of a corporate for
criminally negligent homicide under Texas law); Wisconsin v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537
N.W.2d 420, 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for
criminally negligent homicide under Wisconsin state law); Patrick J. Schott, Comment,
Corporate Criminal Liability for Work-Site Deaths: Old Law Used a New Way, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 793, 805 (1988) (describing the Connecticut prosecution of PGP Industries, Inc. for
criminally negligent homicide that was ultimately dismissed during the trial); Randall Chase,
Refinery Fined in Deadly Blast; Motiva Enterprises Was Ordered to Pay in a 2001 Tank
Explosion That Killed a Backs County Man, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 9, 2003, at B03
(reporting that a corporation pled no contest to charges of criminally negligent homicide
under Delaware law)).
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sexual offenses. 21 The Article proceeds in three Parts. First, I argue that
criminal enforcement against corporations is generally untethered from
harm to victims, and that this thwarts one of the most coherent justifications
for the existence of corporate criminal liability. Next, I argue that a focus
on victim narratives in sentencing, where relevant, can both restore
coherence to the project of corporate criminal liability and expand public
understanding of corporations as potential perpetrators of violent criminal
offenses. Finally, I conclude by speculating about how an increased role for
the victim in the prosecution of entities generally might lead to a greater
willingness among legislatures, prosecutors, and the general public to
recognize corporations as capable of sex offenses.
I. Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal
Not to be overlooked, the existence of corporate criminal liability is quite
controversial in the first place. Many critics ask how a personality-less
entity, incapable of remorse or even incarceration, can be guilty of a
crime. 22 Other critics have suggested that corporate criminal liability creates
redundant punishment, above and beyond civil and regulatory liability, that
over-deters corporate conduct and thus results in a net loss to society. 23 I
have argued elsewhere that the best justification for corporate criminal
liability comes not just from the frequently observed fact that “corporations
do really bad things,” which does not adequately respond to either set of
concerns.24 Instead, the justification lies in the fact that when a corporation
commits a crime, it imposes a distinct set of harms on the victims and on
society—above and beyond the substantive harms caused by the offense—
that flow from the nature of the corporate entity itself.25 I have called these
harms “perceptual harms.”26
21. For a more detailed standard for determining when such corporate mens rea exists,
see Sheley, Tort Answers, supra note 15 and discussion supra note 18.
22. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009); William S. Laufer,
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 655 (1994); Gerhard O.W.
Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on
Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 41–46 (1957).
23. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 322 (1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1510 (1996).
24. Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225,
227 (2012).
25. Id. at 228.
26. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/10

2020]

IMPACT STATEMENTS & CORPORATE SEX CRIMES

215

Perceptual harms amount to the empirically demonstrated sense of
helplessness a victim feels when faced with a perpetrator that is temporally
enduring, powerful, and materially complex. 27 The shattering of a victim’s
“belief in a just world”28—a psychological heuristic that is crucial to a
person’s wellbeing—that occurs when a corporate offender goes
unpunished becomes a unique sort of harm flowing from the corporate
structure itself. 29 In understanding this argument, the prototypical examples
of this effect is the corporate environmental offenses which impose longterm psychological costs on their victims.
For example, the psychological literature has documented a particular
sort of harm in victims of the major oil spills of the last several decades:
evidence suggests the psychological harm experienced by victims is
exacerbated by the corporate nature of the responsible entities and issues
related to assignation of blame. 30 Specifically, the literature has identified,
in addition to the immediate physical losses suffered by the victims of
technological disaster, the victims’ communities also suffer a long-term
social deterioration described as “the corrosive community.” 31 Evidence
attributes part of this corrosive effect to the members of a community
struggling over where to place blame, authorities being evasive and
unresponsive, and victims becoming suspicious and cynical. 32
27. Id. at 259–63.
28. See, e.g., J. Dzuka & C. Dalbert, The Belief in a Just World and Subjective WellBeing in Old Age, 10 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 439, 442 (2006).
29. See Melvin J. Lerner, Dale T. Miller & John G. Holmes, Deserving and the
Emergence of Forms of Justice, 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1976);
Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”:
Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966); Melvin J.
Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its Origins and Forms, 45 J.
PERSONALITY 1 (1977).
30. See Brian Mayer, Katrina Running & Kelly Bergstrand, Compensation and
Community Corrosion: Perceived Inequalities, Social Comparisons, and Competition
Following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 30 SOC. F. 369, 370 (2015).
31. See William R. Freudenburg & Timothy R. Jones, Attitudes and Stress in the
Presence of Technological Risk: A Test of the Supreme Court Hypothesis, 69 SOC. FORCES
1143 (1991) [hereinafter Freudenburg & Jones, Attitudes and Stress]; William R.
Freudenburg, Contamination, Corrosion and the Social Order: An Overview, CURRENT SOC.,
July 1997, at 19; Krzysztof Kaniasty & Fran H. Norris, A Test of the Social Support
Deterioration Model in the Context of Natural Disaster, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 395 (1993); J. Stephen Kroll-Smith & Stephen R. Couch, Symbols, Ecology, and
Contamination: Case Studies in the Ecological-Symbolic Approach to Disaster, 5 RES. IN
SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y 47 (1993).
32. Freudenburg & Jones, Attitudes and Stress, supra note 31, at 1158.
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Psychologist Deborah du Nann Winter, whose expertise centers on the
psychological effects of environmental damage, has observed from her
studies of victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that the primary
emotional reaction among these victims is “anger . . . around the oil
company’s failure to abide by regulations,” as well as “helplessness”
(which she explains by noting the phenomenon of “learned helplessness,”
which is the tendency of organisms to become non-responsive in the face of
situations over which they have no control). 33 Again, the structural
relationship between the corporation and the underlying legal authority that
supports it can be directly linked to the psychological damage experienced
by victims.
Unfortunately, the actual enforcement of the criminal laws against
corporations does not appear to track with the severity of human harms they
impose. Resource-strapped state prosecutors prioritize criminals perceived
as intrinsically “violent,” and other top-down policies often focus on drugs
and weapons.34 While the populist sentiment sparked by the corporate
scandals of the early 2000s led to an increase in state prosecution of
corporations, 35 such prosecutions tend to be pursued more frequently by the
federal government with its broad arsenal of statutory offenses suitable for
corporate misconduct. In one particularly well-known example, after the
Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, the State of Alaska individually prosecuted
Captain Joseph Hazelwood, who was convicted of negligent discharge of
oil and received only a suspended sentence. 36 By contrast, the United States
entered into a $100 million plea agreement with Exxon Corporation. 37
While the federal government prosecutes corporations more frequently
than states do, it nonetheless does so inconsistently and increasingly less

33. Susan Koger, Coping with the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: An Ecopsychology
Interview with Deborah Du Nann Winter, 2 ECOPSYCHOLOGY 205, 205 (2010) (quoting an
answer from Deborah Du Nann Winter).
34. See generally Marcia R. Chaiken & Jan M. Chaiken, Priority Prosecution of HighRate Dangerous Offenders, RES. IN ACTION (Nat’l Inst. for Justice, Washington, D.C.), Mar.
1991, at 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/124135NCJRS.pdf.
35. Dan K. Webb, Robert W. Tarun & Steven F. Molo, CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS § 1.14 (2020) (Lexis).
36. Daniel L. Cheyette, Policing the Corporate Citizen: Arguments for Prosecuting
Organizations, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2008) (discussing Hazelwood v. Alaska,
836 P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska
1993)).
37. Id. at 178.
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often. 38 The rise of the era of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) means greater numbers of criminal
corporations escape formal criminal charges entirely. 39 Instead, these
entities merely pay fines and make stipulated changes to internal
governance. 40 These agreements are “mutually beneficial” to the extent that
they make life easier for prosecutors, who can avoid the massive discovery
costs involved in taking a corporation to trial, 41 and for corporations, who
can avoid the sting of criminal conviction and its collateral effects
(especially the risk of being barred from business with the government, as
happened to both Enron Corporation and its auditor Arthur Andersen). 42
Useful for this analysis, the Department of Justice’s official factors for
determining whether a corporation should be criminally charged include
“the risk of harm to the public” posed by the crime committed. 43 This factor
takes into consideration the reciprocal costs of a prosecution to the public
and to innocent third parties, such as employees of the corporation. 44
However, these guidelines also include such factors as “remedial actions”
and “willingness to cooperate.”45 The prevalence of DPAs thus ties much of
federal criminal enforcement against corporations to the relative ease with
which the two sides can strike a bargain, as opposed to the degree of actual
harm to human victims. Adding to this uncertainty, the use of DPAs and
NPAs is not even consistent across the DOJ: the Environment and Natural
Resources Division and the Antitrust Division rarely use them, while the
Criminal Division and some United States Attorney’s offices resort to them
more often than not. 46
Even with regard to crimes for which DPAs are used more rarely than
they are for, say, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or securities law violations,
enforcement patterns repeatedly ignore human victims. For example, the
government often prosecutes health care fraud, which usually involves false
38. Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of
Corporations, TRAC REPORTS (Oct. 13, 2015), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/
(showing a 29% drop in federal prosecutions of corporations between 2004 and 2014).
39. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements
and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301–02 (2013).
40. Id. at 1301.
41. See id. at 1324.
42. Id. at 1335 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006)); id. at 1337.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL 9-28.300(A)(1) (Nov. 2018), https://www.
justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations.
44. Id. at 9-28.300(A)(8).
45. Id. at 9-28.300(A)(4), (7).
46. Uhlmann, supra note 39, at 1301.
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billings or kickbacks, under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which criminalizes the
knowing and willful execution or attempted execution of any scheme to
defraud a health care benefit program if the scheme relates to the delivery
of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services. 47 Anthony
Kyriakakis argues that the internal politics of the federal criminal justice
system, including both governmental interests and the individual interests
of agents and prosecutors, have led federal prosecutors to treat health care
fraud as just another sort “of fraud against the government or private
insurers.”48 These prosecutors seem to make charging decisions based on
the degree of harm the provider has inflicted on such collective entities,
with little regard for harms suffered by the patients themselves, despite the
fact that they are the most vulnerable stakeholders in the fraudulent
transaction. 49 Kryiakakis asserts that “[t]his has caused the harms suffered
by patients to be minimized, overlooked, or ignored.” 50 A greater attention
to the perceptual harms imposed by an institutional medical actor on the
potentially suffering human being in its care would create an appropriately
coherent enforcement pattern for health care fraud, more consistent with
genuine retributive principles.
As another example, federal prosecutors largely ignore an entire category
of corporate crime where the harm to human victims is arguably the
greatest: violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 51 In the forty
years between when Congress enacted the Act and 2012, there were more
than 400,000 workplace fatalities, yet fewer than eighty cases criminally
prosecuted with only approximately a dozen resulting in convictions. 52
Notably, 2010 saw the worst mining disaster in forty years (the death of
twenty-nine miners in an explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch
Mine) go unpunished criminally, despite a finding of the Mine Safety and

47. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2018).
48. Anthony Kyriakakis, The Missing Victims of Health Care Fraud, 2015 UTAH L.
REV. 605, 611.
49. See id. at 641–43 (discussing that patient harms present a complicated investigatory
and prosecutorial challenge while “[f]ar less complicated are the numbers on a spreadsheet
listing Medicare payments or those on a target’s billing records”).
50. Id. at 611.
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2018).
52. Jordan B. Schwartz & Eric J. Conn, OSHA Criminal Referrals on the Rise, EPSTEIN,
BECKER & GREEN, P.C.: WORKFORCE BULL. (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.oshalawupdate.
com/2012/12/18/osha-criminal-referrals-on-the-rise/.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/10

2020]

IMPACT STATEMENTS & CORPORATE SEX CRIMES

219

Health Administration that Massey’s “unlawful policies and practices . . .
were the root cause.”53
In short: any attempt to hold corporations criminally liable for the sex
offenses of their employees must contend with several unfortunate truths.
The first is that criminal prosecution of corporations is already rarer than
warranted, even as a general matter. The second is that punishment of
white-collar crime has remained conceptually untethered from the existence
of human victims, however inconsistent that may be with the harm principle
and general principles of retribution. Due to state prosecutors’ lower degree
of interest in corporations generally, these problems are likely to be
amplified in the state criminal courts with jurisdiction over most sex
offenses.
II. Victim Impact Statements at Corporate Sentencing
To create a greater public demand for corporate prosecution, and to pave
the way for courts and state legislatures to acknowledge institutional
culpability for sex offenses in the cases where it can be proven, I argue that
prosecutors should pay closer attention to the role of the victims of
corporate crime generally. Specifically, where prosecutors can identify
victims, those victims should be made aware of the opportunity to read
victim impact statements (VIS) during a corporate sentencing proceeding.
This would assist in the process of (a) breaking down the conceptual barrier
between corporate and individual crime, which prevents us from viewing a
corporation as capable of committing a crime of violence and (b) helping to
better tether the project of criminalizing corporations to some version of the
harm principle, as opposed to the goal of prosecutorial economy.
It should be noted at the outset that in general criminal law, scholars take
a rather dim view of the use of VIS. Susan Bandes fears they mobilize
merely lower order emotions against the defendant and that they “evoke not
merely sympathy, pity, and compassion for the victim, but also a complex
set of emotions directed toward the defendant, including hatred, fear, racial
animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated vengeance, and the desire to purge
collective anger.”54 She argues that they shift the focus away from the
defendant’s moral culpability and toward “a thirst for undifferentiated
53. Uhlmann, supra note 39, at 1296 (quoting MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION, Apr.
5, 2010, at 2).
54. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 395 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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vengeance.”55 She also believes that the narratives developed during the
guilt phase of the trial are already stacked against the defendant by the time
sentencing takes place.56
Martha Minow opposes victim evidence for fear that it will encourage
dueling victim narratives between the victim and defendant; she urges that
the system adopt normative standards for evaluating “historical” harm
experienced by oppressed groups, as opposed to individuals.57 And Jennifer
Culbert sees VIS as inappropriately establishing the suffering of the victim
as an incontrovertible basis for deciding punishment in an otherwise
pluralistic and morally relativistic society. 58 These scholars all present
extremely valid concerns about the potentially prejudicial effects of victim
narratives at trial. Yet these arguments rely on a bilateral view of
sentencing in which the victim’s only function is to oppose the interests of
the defendant. Indeed, many popular arguments in favor of VIS rely on
similar, but symmetrically opposite, grounds: that we should prioritize the
victim’s individual needs over the defendant’s by allowing VIS. 59
In my past scholarship I have made two arguments in defense of VIS.
First, I have argued that the current debate on the victim’s participation in
the criminal sentencing process ignores how “the complexity of a victim
narrative effectively conveys” to the sentencing body the community’s
“experience of harm, without which the criminal justice system loses its

55. Id. at 398; see also Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 67, 123 (1992) (criticizing the use of unanticipated consequences of a crime as
aggravated sentencing factors simply for the purpose of ameliorating a “public sense of
injustice”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 89–90 (1993)
(showing how the retributive theory of punishment is, in the first place, “committed to a
certain neglect of the particulars” regarding the defendant’s situation).
56. See Bandes, supra note 54, at 400.
57. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1437–38 (1993).
58. Jennifer L. Culbert, The Sacred Name of Pain: The Role of Victim Impact Evidence
in Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions, in PAIN, DEATH AND THE LAW 103, 104–05 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2001).
59. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of
Capital Crime Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2004) (arguing that the state’s
tendency, in recent years, to fetishize the “crime victim” has been a justification for
conservative criminal legislation); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J.
1835, 1884 (2005) (arguing that VIS do not serve the ends of “fairness,” which he defines
explicitly as allowing the defendant to assume the “narrative posture . . . of a Scheherazade,
telling stories to the state so she may live . . . untrammeled by other voices”) (footnote
omitted).
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legitimacy as a penal authority.” 60 This full account of public harm is
crucial to the retributive function of sentencing and, if it is excluded, the
system risks perceptions of illegitimacy.61
Using a collection of victim impact statements from the sentencing of a
Pan Am Flight 73 hijacker, I demonstrated how particular narrative features
of VIS work to make a victim’s harm accessible to a listener. 62 I argued
that, because these victim stories also circulate through society outside of
the courtroom, they shape social norms about culpability. 63 I concluded that
if the sentencing process cannot accommodate victim stories, it risks
illegitimacy in the eyes of a society guided by these norms. 64 It also risks
allowing undifferentiated stereotypes, developed by political and media
actors, to take the place of individuated victim accounts in the mind of a
fact-finder.65
Looking beyond the impact on effect of VIS on the sentencing body
itself, the second argument considered their external, or expressive
function. The external impact of victim statements has been compounded
by the rise of social media as a means of transmitting unmediated trial
narratives through public spaces they have not penetrated in the past.66 “I
argue[d] that the traditional news media has long distorted public
perceptions about crime and punishment, thereby undermining the
expressive function of criminal justice.” 67 The traditional Marxist critique
of the media asserts that those in power manipulate the press to harness
support for policies that criminalize those with the least power in society. 68
However, the “left realist” school of criminology points out that the whole
of public concern about crime is hardly the product of false
consciousness.69 There are quite rational reasons to fear crime and many

60. Erin Sheley, Reverberations of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and
the Cultural Project of Punishment, 87 IND. L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (2012).
61. Id. at 1249.
62. Id. at 1272–77.
63. Id. at 1277–84.
64. Id. at 1285.
65. Id.
66. Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Expressive Punishment in the Age of
Social Media, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 157, 158 (2017) [hereinafter Sheley, Victim Impact
Statements].
67. Id. at 159.
68. YVONNE JEWKES, MEDIA AND CRIME 16, 24 (3d ed. 2015).
69. See, e.g., Jock Young, The Tasks Facing a Realist Criminology, 11 CONTEMP.
CRISES 337 (1987).
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people, in fact, fear it due to direct interaction with actual victims. 70
Unmediated victim narratives have therefore always been an important
source of information about actual criminal harm, particularly harm to
victims ignored by the prevailing media account.
I have used examples drawn from the circulation of victim narratives
about police violence attendant to the Black Lives Matter movement, as
well as the uniquely impactful viral victim impact statement delivered by
Emily Doe in the Stanford rape case (to which I will return shortly) 71 to
illustrate how the expressive function of punishment has become even more
critical in light of “new” media.72 One could argue, of course, that victim
narratives can be disseminated without being first expressed during a
formal sentencing hearing—the police violence videos are a good example
of this. Yet, to the extent that institutions of justice support these narratives
by providing a forum for their expression and dissemination, the institutions
themselves are participating in what Anthony Duff describes as the
“communicative” purpose of punishment.73 Punishment sends a message to
the offender about his conduct, to the victim about his or her worth in the
eyes of the community, and to the community about what we morally
require from one another.74 The system serves this purpose better if it
incorporates unmediated victim narratives into this process.
In sum, particularly in the era of “viral” social media content, VIS can be
used to vindicate the rights of the powerless against the powerful as easily
as they can be used to increase the punitiveness of the justice system
against certain defendants. And, in our status quo universe, in which VIS
will continue to be used in the latter capacity, there is arguably a greater
moral urgency to use them in the former as well. Corporate criminal
punishment provides an ideal setting for this endeavor. It is hard to think of
a greater power asymmetry than that existing between a corporate
defendant on the one hand and an individual human victim on the other.
We don’t have examples of many victim impact statements at corporate
criminal trials, but it is helpful to consider a couple of victim narratives
70. See, e.g., id. at 337 (arguing that perceptions of crime are largely “constructed out of
the material experiences of people rather than fantasies impressed upon them by the mass
media or agencies of the State”); ADAM CRAWFORD, TREVOR J ONES, TOM WOODHOUSE &
JOCK YOUNG, THE SECOND ISLINGTON CRIME SURVEY 76 (1990) (“In inner city areas, mass
media coverage of crime tends to reinforce what people already know.”).
71. See infra Part III.
72. Sheley, Victim Impact Statements, supra note 66, at 172–73, 175–85.
73. R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1182 (2005).
74. See id.
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about corporate harm occurring in other formal settings. Consider, for
example, the victims of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, in which a coal
slurry dam owned by the Pittston Corporation burst and caused 125 citizens
of Logan County, West Virginia to drown in black sludge. 75 (Additionally,
the property destruction left 4000 people homeless.) 76 Despite the fact that
the investigation determined that the dam had violated numerous federal
and state safety regulations, 77 no criminal charges were ever filed against
the Pittston Corporation, its subsidiary Buffalo Mining Co., or any of their
officers.78 The citizens of the Buffalo Creek area formed a Citizens
Commission to investigate the disaster, which concluded:
We think that this coal company, Pittston, has murdered the
people, and we call upon the prosecuting attorney and the
judge . . . to prosecute and bring to trial this coal company . . . .
....
. . . [T]he fact of the matter is that these are all laws on the
books which the company felt completely free to ignore, which
says something about the relationships between coal companies
and state governments . . . just this complete freedom to ignore
these laws with no fear of any kind of prosecution. 79
These words make explicit the perceptual harms that corporate crime
imposes on its victims. The Buffalo Creek victims’ commission identified,
as part of the trauma the community had suffered, their comparative
helplessness relative to a company with (a) continued temporal existence
and (b) some sort of interrelationship with structures of state power.
Very similar themes appear in the congressional testimony of Keith
Jones, whose son Gordon died in the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig
explosion:

75. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER ix (1976); see also Paul Cowan,
The Buffalo Creek Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/
1976/09/05/archives/the-buffalo-creek-disaster.html.
76. STERN, supra note 75, at x.
77. Cowan, supra note 75.
78. William Rhee, Buffalo Creek Timeline, W.V.U. C. OF L., https://www.law.wvu.
edu/buffalo-creek-symposium/buffalo-creek-timeline (last visited May 19, 2020) (“Special
grand jury led by two special prosecuting attorneys . . . brings no criminal indictments
against Pittston.”).
79. The Buffalo Creek Flood: An Act of Man Transcript, BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 5,
https://buffalocreekflood.org/media/BCF-transcript.pdf (last visited May 19, 2020).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

224

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:209

Transocean, Halliburton, and any other company will be back
because they have the infrastructure and economic might to
make more money. But Gordon will never be back. Never. And
neither will the 10 good men who died with him. 80
Again, it is not only the loss of Gordon that Jones identifies here but the
asymmetry between that loss and the impossibility of an equivalent loss on
the side of an enduring entity like Halliburton. The disruption to the beliefin-a-just-world heuristic resulting from perceived unfairness 81 appears in
both these accounts of suffering due to unpunished or inadequately
punished corporate crime.
These victim narratives draw attention to the sine qua non of a corporate
criminal act—to that which justifies punishing the institution itself above
and beyond the culpable individual actors that can and should also be
charged where possible. It is not just that the harm imposed by corporations
is severe. That can be true and yet it still be the case that punishing both
individual employees and the corporation is redundant if the latter is
punished for the same harm as the former. The issue is that the psychic
harm posed by corporate crime is distinct in kind.
From these premises it becomes clear that victim narratives have the
potential to give coherence to a conceptually unstable area of the criminal
law. Whatever one thinks of the respondeat superior standard as a tool for
distributing corporate criminal liability, there is a clear retributive
theoretical basis for doing so. And the use of VIS at corporate sentencing
reifies this unique corporate criminal harm for a sentencing body, whose
job it is to dispense appropriate punishment. We now turn to the particular
importance of victim narratives in the unique context of corporate sex
crimes.
III. Victim Impact Statements and Corporate Sexual Abuse
This discussion has seemingly wandered far afield of the particular topic
of corporate liability for sexual abuse; it is time to bring it home. Victim
impact statements help us understand the need for corporate criminal
liability while, in turn, corporate criminal liability, as a concept, needs
victim narratives in order to have intellectual coherence, to function
according to traditional harm principles. With both pieces in place, the
80. Legal Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Keith D. Jones, Baton Rouge,
La.).
81. See supra Part I.
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nature of corporate sexual abuse as a crime requiring distinct institutional,
as well as individual, punishment emerges into the light. Victim narratives
help us understand how a non-human entity may be the proximate cause of
a sex offense, even if the offending employee cannot be said to have been
acting in any way to benefit his employer.
Larry Nassar’s sentencing hearing featured, as noted, 160 victim impact
statements.82 Among those, one of the most frequently quoted was that of
Aly Raisman (2016 Olympic team captain and multiple medalist), whose
description of the abuse she suffered reveals how helpless she felt in a
situation that had been created and imposed by USA Gymnastics as a
condition of maintaining her career. Speaking in the first person, she
relived her abuse for the courtroom. She told Nassar, “I don’t want you
to be there, but I don’t have a choice. Treatments with you were
mandatory.” 83 The psychological pressure imposed by USA Gymnastics
on the young gymnast constitutes action that rose to the level of
proximate causation: her abuse was “mandatory” because the structure
of power the organization maintained imposed limits on its participants’
basic horizon of possibility.
Raisman also criticizes USA Gymnastics’ failure to do anything when
they had notice of a problem:
False assurances from organizations are dangerous, especially
when people want so badly to believe them. They make it easier
to move away from the problem and enable bad things to
continue to happen. And even now after all that has happened,
USA Gymnastics has the nerve to say the very same things it has
said all along. 84
Here again she unwittingly expresses the principle of omission as causation,
which is probably the theory more likely to arise in corporate sexual abuse
82. The inclusion of so many victims who were not the victims he was convicted of
assaulting in that particular trial raises some due process problems, which have been noted
elsewhere. See, e.g., Anne E. Gowen, How the Judge in Larry Nassar’s Case Undermined
Justice, TIME (Jan. 26, 2018, 1:15 PM EST), http://time.com/5119433/larry-nassar-judgerosemarie-aquilina-justice/; Justice for Whom?: The Dangers of the Growing Victims’ Rights
Movement, HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 27, 2018), https://harvardcrcl.org/
justice-for-whom-the-dangers-of-the-growing-victims-rights-movement/.
83. Mahita Gajanan, ‘It’s Your Turn to Listen to Me.’ Read Aly Raisman’s Testimony at
Larry Nassar’s Sentencing, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:52 PM ET), https://time.com/5110455/
aly-raisman-larry-nassar-testimony-trial/ (providing an account of Aly Raisman’s full
statement).
84. Id.
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cases (most of which are likely to lack the extreme conditions of the USA
Gymnastics scenario). Nonetheless, she articulates the extent to which the
organization’s assurances represented an undertaking to protect its athletes,
which it violated. Its behavior was “dangerous” for precisely the same
reason that an undertaking generally creates a legal duty that, in AngloAmerican law, forms the basis for a criminal omission. Finally, like the
victims in the Buffalo Creek and Deepwater Horizon examples given
above, Raisman points to the endurance of USA Gymnastics—its static
ability to continue on in its false representations and to outlive the various
athletes it victimized—as a component of the harm to which she testifies. 85
Narratives like Raisman’s have the potential to serve a unique purpose:
to transmit to the public the lived reality of something that may not seem
intellectually plausible: sexual assault by an entity. We have seen a similar
power to transmit a different sort of narrative about sexual violation in
Emily Doe’s victim impact statement in “Stanford swimmer” Brock
Turner’s sentencing. 86 Emily Doe expressed the horrifying experience of
not remembering a sexual assault.87 Instead of the testimonial impairment
doubters tend to infer from such a lack of memory in similar scenarios, Doe
demonstrated to the world how her fragmented recollection was instead a
condition rendering her assault more horrific and her account more
accurate.
Narratives of sexual abuse are notoriously challenging, both to articulate
and to receive. Yet such narratives are crucial to the criminal justice system
being able to process the reality of institutional sexual offenses. Obviously,
as noted, few corporate scenarios involve quite the same degree of
categorical control imposed by an institution on the victims of sexual
assault as the USA Gymnastics case does. Nonetheless, extreme examples
can, at least, serve to disprove a general principle—in this case, that it is
“not possible” for a non-human entity to commit a sexual offense. For the
criminal justice system to fully account for the unique harms of corporate
crime generally, it must make a greater general effort to include victim
narratives in already-existing corporate prosecutions. This is the first step.
The second is for advocates to provide public forums for victims of
corporate sex crimes to tell their stories and thereby generate a public

85. Id.
86. Katie J.M. Baker, Here’s the Powerful Letter the Stanford Victim Read to Her
Attacker, BUZZFEEDNEWS.COM (June 3, 2016, 4:17 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.
com/article/katiejmbaker/heres-the-powerful-letter-the-stanford-victim-read-to-her-ra.
87. Id.
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demand for what would, essentially, amount to the creation of corporate
criminal liability for sexual offenses.
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